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Foucault spent time investigating the stopping of mobilities, notably when studying carceral spaces 
such as asylums and prisons which effectively immobilise their inmates at a societal scale. In 
Discipline and Punish, he speculates on how such spaces are designed to put a stop to casual 
‘nomadisms’. The purpose here is to inspect this aspect of Foucault’s thinking, particularly to recover 
what he also said about the regulation and cultivation of mobilities within the depths of immobility. 
Attention is also drawn to an engagement with mobility-immobility appearing in Foucault's little-
discussed Psychiatric Power lectures (2006b), prompted by the ideas-and-practices of Edouard 
Seguin, an educator of 'idiot' children, whose own words provide additional ‘empirical’ weight to an 
emerging argument. Reading the unabridged English translation of Madness and Civilization (2006a), 
a final claim is that Foucault’s phenomenology of ‘madness’ depends upon unruly mobilities within 
the asylum, the very stuff of “unstable and dangerous coagulation”. The overall ambition is to furnish 
an alternative account of Foucault and mobilities, concentrating on those Foucauldian texts initially 
seeming the least promising for scholars of mobilities. 
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Introduction: ‘Willie’, institutions and mobilities within immobilities 
 
Let me begin with ‘Willie’ or ‘Wullie’, a long-term patient resident in the now-closed Craig 
Dunain Hospital, previously known as the Inverness District Hospital (originally opened 
1864), in the Highlands of Scotland, northern Britain.1 As just one among so many 
withdrawn, barely communicating and largely forgotten dwellers living out their days in 
isolated mental institutions, the ‘lunatic asylums’ peppering the landscapes of Britain and 
elsewhere from the later-eighteenth through into the later-twentieth century, Willie was 
nonetheless distinctive in how he moved around ‘the Craig’.  Jim Neville, a psychiatric nurse, 
wrote about him: 
 
I saw Willie as having the same routine every day … . He usually passed me in 
the mornings running his finger along the picture-rail above his head. It 
seemed to be paramount to him not to allow his finger to drop or stray from 
its wall-hugging contour. He only let go when the rail ended at the front door. 
To me, it were as if he was on rails. (Neville, n.d., 5) 
 
Neville (2000; also Philo, 2007a) crafted a story about Willie, calling it Trolley-buses, after 
buses powered by electric current picked up from overhead wires with which they need to 
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keep in constant contact, much like Willie with his finger reaching up the picture-rail.  
Neville (n.d, 5) also conjured other mobility metaphors to convey Willie’s patterned 
movements: 
 
He’s usually walking towards me on my right, his left forefinger running along 
the architrave [picture-rail] that runs the length of the corridor just above his 
head, hooked on to it as heads to and from his ward. That architrave must be 
spotless, maybe even worn. No rust on those rails … . “Oor Wullie,” … he’s 
always on the move, restless, rustless. I’ve often wondered what picture you 
could get it you put a tag on him and traced his movements over a week or so. 
I’m absolutely sure that there would be a real pattern like the marks that old 
drovers’ roads and sheep tracks make from years of use, and that you can see 
from the air. 
 
Willie’s movements had boundaries, parts of the hospital where the picture-rails stopped or 
which were simply not ‘in’ his world: for instance, he never ventured ‘east’ of the hospital’s 
central entrance hall, what Neville called ‘Square One’, which was hence terra incognitae for 
Willie.  Such boundaries were imposed upon him, or at least ‘suggested’ to him, by both the 
specific lay-out of the Craig and the basal spatial logic of what was ultimately a carceral 
institution: one designed to separate out the likes of Willie, the troubled and troubling, from 
the rest of ‘us’.  Quite how he configured his own movements within the institution, what 
they meant to him and possibly to any others who cared to notice, is then another matter: 
the strange phenomenon of mobilities within immobilities. 
 
The specific resonance of this vignette for what follows will be amplified shortly, but first it 
is worth underlining that questions about immobilities have long been registered, if not 
always foregrounded, within contributions to the so-called ‘new mobilities paradigm’ 
(Cresswell, 2010).  Cresswell’s pioneering text In Place/Out of Place (Cresswell, 1996, esp. 
Chap.4) acknowledged the ‘deviancy’ of mobilities enacted by groupings who seemingly 
have no ‘fixed abode’, such as ‘Gypsies’ and New Age Travellers, noting the sustained efforts 
of the UK police (driven by politicans’ diktat) to block off ‘Hippy Convoys’ from moving when 
and where they wanted.  Once he had more formally framed his concern with mobilities, as 
in his landmark On the Move text (Cresswell, 2006a), the production of differential 
mobilities – of different speeds, for different people, in different contexts – became pivotal 
alongside the recognition that in some instances the outcome is indeed immobility (‘some 
mobilities are dependent on the immobilities of others’: Cresswell, 2006b, 22).  
Subsequently, he has stated that in such inquiries ‘‘moorings’ are often as important as 
‘mobilities’,’ adding that ‘[s]peeds, slowness and immobilities are all related in ways that are 
thoroughly infused with power and its distribution” (Cresswell, 2010, 18, 21).  That research 
on mobilities should take seriously the realities and impositions of immobilities was 
recognised in the editorial introduction to the first issue of the journal Mobilities (Hannam 
et al, 2006; also Adey, 2006; Salter, 2013), while a theme issue of the journal M/C has 
appeared specifically tackling the phenomenon of ‘Still’ (Bissell and Fuller, 2009).  An 
expanded collection of essays, Stillness in a Mobile World (Bissell and Fuller, 2011a), 
sharpens this consideration by proposing the need for ‘a sensitivity to still [to stillness, to 
being still, to experiencing being still] as a relation-to-the-world that moves beyond the 
dualisms of mobility and immobility’ (Bissell and Fuller, 2011b, 12; also Bissell and Fuller, 
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2009b).  The claim is not merely that some peoples or objects are rendered immobile, 
enjoying or enduring a ‘cessation’ of their movement, it is rather that being still has its own 
logics, dynamics, affective qualities and ‘potentials’ (not least for movements that are 
always, as it were, germinating in the heart of the still: also Murphie, 2011) or 
‘productivities’ (perhaps for enhancing processes such as scholarly learning: also Watkins 
and Noble, 2011).  I confess that in what follows I continue to conceive matters in terms of a 
relation (if not dualism) between mobility and immobility, but it should become apparent 
that just such an enlivened sense of stillness – while understood through a Foucauldian 
optic virtually absent from the Stillness collection – is absolutely crucial to my unfolding 
argument. 
 
To return to Willie, however, what his vignette also specifically highights is the problematic 
of how mobilities and immobilities intersect in and around the ‘closed spaces’ (Wolpert, 
1976) comprised by carceral institutions of various kinds.  As Cresswell (2006b, 17) noted, 
‘there are the modernist and reactionary forces of ‘confinement’ – education, nationalism, 
hospitals, asylums and the military’ (my emphases) wherein mobilities are purposefully 
curtailed for varying reasons, as we can suppose, of maintaining good order, preserving 
boundary integrity, ensuring ‘treatment’ continuity or even as a form of punishment.  
Carceral institutions such as asylums and prisons thus do not seem the most obvious foci for 
mobilities research, given that their ostensible rationale is precisely the stopping of 
mobilities, and so traffic between the ‘new mobilities paradigm’ and work on the likes of 
asylum or prison geographies is unsurprisingly limited.  That said, exactly this issue has been 
addressed by Moran et al with reference to prisons (2012, 449): 
 
Prison seems inherently spatially ‘fixed’, and prisoners in turn immobile by 
virtue of their imprisonment, and in the same way that the mobilities turn has 
overlooked disciplined mobility, carceral geography is at risk of neglecting 
mobility. ... [P]risons may seem to be the epitome of immobility, with inmates 
incarcerated within a static physical space of detention. 
 
Moran et al argue for attention to what they term ‘disciplined mobility’, which in their own 
research means the commencement of disciplinary techniques – understood in a loosely 
Foucauldian frame (see below) – during the often remarkably long journeys of ‘prisoner 
transport’ from their home regions to prisons sited in Russia’s remote ‘penal peripheries’ 
(also Pallot, 2005; and on ‘journeys to asylum’ see Philo, 1995).  They nonetheless 
acknowledge that there are also mobilities within individual prisons that can and should 
draw the eye of the researcher, mentioning ‘the micro-scale mobility of inmates and staff 
within a penal institution’ (Moran et al, 2012, 449; also Minke and Lemonne, 2013) and 
citing as evidence my own paper on ‘Accumulating populations’ in prison environments 
(Philo, 2001).  I did indeed devote some passages in that paper to discussing varieties of 
movements around prison spaces, and in small measure anticipated the broader themes of 
the present paper, but I was not addressing the subject-matter through a lens explicitly 
attuned to mobilities or, more pointedly, to the interplay between mobilities and 
immobilities.  In the spirit of Moran et al’s provocation,2 then, let me now train my sights 
squarely on just this interplay, and at the same time endeavour to prize open its mysteries 
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through pursuing in greater depth what Foucault has to say, chiefly in his carceral studies, 
about and beyond ‘the stopping of mobilities’. 
 
Foucault and the war on ‘nomadic’ multitudes 
 
The thematic of this paper is thus how the mobility-immobility relations runs throughout the 
oeuvre of Michel Foucault, even in his writings which ostensibly prioritise the immobile, still 
and sedentary.  I will explore this thematic as a mini-task of detection, travelling a circuitous 
route through Foucault’s oeuvre, sometimes on by-ways rather than main roads, and 
gradually revealing rather than pre-announcing a line of argument.  Moreover, rather than 
alighting where he most obviously addresses mobilities, perhaps his lectures on ‘biopolitics’ 
when discussing the ‘circulations’ central to the ‘metabolism’ of a city or nation-state (eg. 
Foucault, 2004a, 2004b, 2007, 2008; also Baerenholdt, 2013; Ek and Hultman, 2008; Nally, 
2010), I will concentrate on texts that might initially seem the least promising for the scholar 
of mobilities.  Indeed, if we contemplate Foucault’s major book-length works of social-
institutional history, Madness and Civilization (Foucault, 1961, 1965, 2006a) and Discipline 
and Punish (Foucault, 1975, 1976), a first thought must be that at a macro-scale they chart 
the emergence of secure or carceral spaces – specialist spaces of immobility – designed to 
curtail the mobilities of certain problematic populations (the ‘mad’ and the ‘bad’) reckoned 
in one way or another to compromise the smooth functioning of a given society.  They are 
spaces supposed to prevent the ready co-mingling of these populations with, and hence 
their disturbing or even contaminating influence upon, the allegedly ‘normal’ (‘not-mad’ and 
‘not-bad’) members of everyday social spaces.  Certain qualifications might be lent to this 
starkly binary vision, maybe echoing Foucault’s own scrambling – at the outset of the 
Abnormal lecture series (Foucault, 1999, 2003b) – of a simple inclusion-exclusion dyad in 
favour of a more nuanced portrayal, inspired by Canguilheim (1973: see Philo, 2007b), of 
how the ‘normal’ deploy a variety of spatial strategies to operate upon the ‘abnormal’ (if 
possible to ‘normalise’ them). 
 
The emphasis on immobility cannot be denied, even so, and it is tracked forensically down 
to micro-levels of engagement in Discipline and Punish, and positioned as integral to the 
‘micro-physics of power’ which this book so famously ushered into Western social-
theoretical consciousness.  Modern ‘disciplinary power’, from the later-1700s, is seemingly 
all about ‘fixing’ things and people in space, immobilising them, with Foucault (1976, 218) 
stating that ‘one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic 
technique.’ It is decisively anti-mobility, or rather opposed to all unsanctioned mobilities 
which foster promiscuous associations among the ‘nomadic’ multitudes: 
 
Avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions; analyse 
confused, massive or transient pluralities. …  One must eliminate the effects of 
imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their 
diffuse circulation, their unstable and dangerous coagulation … . Its aim [is] to 
establish presences and absences, to know how to locate individuals, and to 
set up useful communications, to interrupt others … . (Foucault, 1976, 143) 
 
The vocabulary implies a bridge across to Deleuze and Guattari (2004a, 2004b), with their 
claims about the ‘territorialisation’ (or ‘striating’) of space to ‘fix’ the threatening 
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‘smoothness’ of ‘nomadic’ slip-sliding by things and people risking an escape from the 
‘apparatuses of capture’ demanded by the imperatives of Capital, State and Society.  It 
thereby signals a wider terrain of academic debate about what Foucault owes to Deleuze 
and his co-workers, and vice versa, but for my purposes it usefully heralds a horizon (even a 
spatial imagination) that can, if implicitly, animate the remainder of this paper. 
 
To make some obvious points, when Foucault describes ‘the art of distributions’ integral to 
modern ‘disciplinary power’ – noting that, ‘in the first instance, discipline proceeds from the 
distribution of individuals in space’ (Foucault, 1976, 150; also Driver, 1994; Hannah, 1997) – 
he spells out both the macro- and the micro-level immobilities inscribed by modern prisons 
and related institutions.  The first principle here is enclosure, the placing of target 
populations in closed-off spaces, exactly that immobilising of these populations mentioned 
above to prevent easy traffic with the rest of ‘us’ and better to facilitate tightly-regulated 
programmes of disciplinary control.  The second is partitioning, the dividing up or sub-
sectioning of institutional spaces, individualising inmates in their own ‘cells’ or at least 
breaking up collectivities into smaller groupings, thereby reducing ‘contagion’ (physical and 
moral) between inmates while rendering them more easily manageable within institutional 
routines.  These principles clearly informed Bentham’s infamous late-eighteenth century 
‘Panoption’ design for an ideal prison-house, a keystone if over-emphasised element of 
Foucault’s reasoning in Discipline and Punish (Elden, 2003); but they also featured, if more 
subtly, in the nineteenth-century reformatory for boys at Mettray, an equally salient if less-
noted element infusing the later pages of the same text (Driver, 1990).  This much is 
familiar, and has been documented in countless empirical studies inspired by Discipline and 
Punish,3 but a close reading reveals that Foucault’s account is also about the careful 
regulation, even promotion, of (intended, sanctioned) mobilities.  Traced empirically 
through what he calls ‘a History of Detail’ (Foucault, 1976, 140), he elaborates ‘a general 
theory of dressage’ (Foucault, 1976, 136) pertaining to the intimate shaping of human 
posture, gesture and capacity for movement.  Usually conceived in terms of equine 
dressage, the highly choreographed movements of horse-with-human-rider, Foucault (1976, 
155) speaks of how ‘[a] new body was being formed,’ less a mechanical body of ‘assigned 
movements’ and more an organic body in harmony with supposedly natural forces.  It was 
to be a body trained through repetitive but non-artificial exercises: thus, not the artificial 
mobility of a body instructed in particular, maybe singular actions (‘fire that cannon!’), but 
more the natural mobility of a body moving rhythmically with the affordances of bone, joint, 
nerve, muscle and sinew, a thoroughly embodied and not en-minded knowledge.  As 
Foucault (1976, 152) also puts it: 
 
Disciplinary control does not consist simply in teaching or imposing a series of 
particular gestures; it imposes the best relation between a gesture and the 
overall position of the body, which is its condition of efficiency and speed. 
 
The reference to ‘speed’ underscores that he is talking here about mobilities, but such a 
connection is implied by any consideration of a ‘relation’ between ‘gesture’ and overall 
bodily comportment, as will be further explained presently. 
 
The military body is highly relevant in this context, not least because Foucault (1976, 135) 
opens the third major part of Discipline and Punish (entitled ‘Discipline’ and starting a 
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chapter called ‘Docile Bodies’) by taking his reader to the parade-ground of marching 
soldier-recruits: 
 
By the late-eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be 
made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body …; posture is gradually corrected; a 
calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, 
making it pliable, ready at all times turning silently into the automatism of 
habit. 
 
Marching – striding rhythmically, purposely forwards; arms, legs and torso in complete 
harmony; a disciplining of natural mobility, conformable with how these body-parts 
naturally move in co-ordination one with the other – is thereby presented by Foucault, if I 
may be allowed to express it so, as a ‘phenomenology’ of mobility mastered.4  This mobility 
is nonetheless set in juxtaposition with immobility, in part the relative immobility of the 
recruits in their set-apart military camp,5 but more immediately the immobility of standing 
stock-still.  As required by a French ordinance of 1764: ‘Recruits become accustomed to … 
“standing upright … [T]hey will be taught … to remain motionless until the order is given, 
without moving the head, the hands or the feet … .”’ (Foucault, 1976, 136, my emphasis).  In 
this condition, recruits should be poised, wholly immobile but on the brink of movement, 
able to switch in an instant from immobility to mobility as a natural, not forced, act, with all 
the ‘efficiency and speed’ that can be mustered.  The significance of putting matters like this 
will become apparent later, but for the moment the simple conclusion is that, here at the 
heart of the text where Foucault is itemising the ‘fixative’ practices of an ‘anti-nomadic’ 
modern disciplinary power, the productive shaping of mobilities – and, moreover, of what 
might be cast as a ‘dialectics’6 between mobilities and immobilities – remains provocatively 
at issue. 
 
Psychiatric Power: some little-known Foucauldian diversions 
 
I propose now to pursue such themes through Foucault’s somewhat neglected Psychiatric 
Power lectures, delivered in 1973-1974 as part of the overall Collège de France lecture 
series, recomposed and published in French in 2003 before being translated and published 
in English in 2006 (Foucault, 2003a, 2006b; also Philo, 2007c, 2012, 2013; Elden, 2006).  
These lectures may be cast as Foucault returning to (some of) the ground covered by 
Madness and Civilization, but now framed through lenses provided by his conceptual and 
substantive work for Discipline and Punish.  He had already trialled much of this work in the 
two lecture series preceding the 1973-1974 series, and it is probable that much if not all of 
Discipline and Punish, published in French in 1975, was written before he delivered the 
lectures that were subsequently entitled Psychiatric Power.  These lectures differ from 
Madness and Civilization in narrowing the focus from the latter’s epochal surveying of grand 
shifts in the perception and treatment of ‘madness’ across the longe durée of European 
history from Medieval times to the later-nineteenth century.  Relatedly, they lose that epic 
sense of charting an historical geography of Madness and Reason – this binary structure of 
world-shaping forces or phenomena – dancing around each other down the ages, with the 
latter progressively acquiring the instruments (symbolic, discursive and material) for 
excluding the former, whether chasing it into the wilderness, capturing it in the carceral 
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embrace of the asylum or compelling it to be silent except insofar as permitted to speak in 
‘the clinic’ using authorised vocabularies of mental science (psychoanalysis included).  
Instead, the Psychiatric Power lectures provide a sustained inquiry into the micro-physics of 
power as exerted in the claustrophobic spaces of nineteenth-century lunatic asylums, what I 
have elsewhere (Philo, 2007c) called a detailed ‘scenography’ played out across countless 
tiny empirical scenes of ‘psychiatric power’.7  In each such scene, we learn about asylum 
medical superintendents (and their staff) striving to achieve practical control – itself scantly-
authorised by any reliable ‘medical’ or ‘scientific’ knowledge – over their more-or-less 
disordered and unbiddable lunatic charges; and many of the tactics deployed were clearly 
interventions in the embodied (im)mobilities of these massed inmates. 
 
‘[P]sychiatric power is above all a certain way of managing, of administering, before being a 
cure or therapeutic intervention,’ writes Foucault (2006b, 173), and a pivotal assertion of 
these lectures is that psychiatry (and the broader terrain of the emergent ‘psy-‘disciplines) 
was an offshoot, a by-product, even a post hoc rationalisation of ‘psychiatric power’: an 
assemblage of nosologies, aetiologies, diagnoses and prognoses largely arising after the 
event of asylum personnel finding ways to regulate the mind-bodies of their disturbed 
inmates.  This power – or variable array of powers – came to be understood as ‘medical’ 
primarily by virtue of being exercised by individuals who occupied a ‘space’ analogous to 
that of doctors and nurses in places of medical treatment for the physically unwell, an 
unstable relationship dating back centuries but now given solidity by the very spatial form of 
the asylum as an imitation of the hospital.8  What Foucault (2006b, 181) particularly 
stresses, however, is the figure of the asylum’s medical superintendent or doctor/physician, 
and how his – it was always his – embodied presence necessarily impressed itself upon 
‘asylum space’: 
 
It seems to me that the interior of the asylum is given a medical stamp by the 
presence of the doctor; it is through his omnipresence, the assimilation, if you 
like, of asylum space to the psychiatrist’s body. The asylum is the psychiatrist’s 
body, stretched and distended to dimensions of an establishment, extended to 
the point that his power is exerted as if every part of the asylum is a part of his 
own body, controlled by his nerves. More precisely, I would say that this 
assimilation, psychiatrist’s body-asylum space, is revealed in different ways. 
 
Arguably, what arises is much more than the anonymous occularcentricism of the 
Panopticon, although Bentham’s progeny is occasionally name-checked in Psychiatric 
Power; rather, it is a more embodied, organic inhabitation of asylum space by an inspecting 
and intervening figure – very different from the distanced, disembodied observer in the 
Panopticon tower – constantly criss-crossing asylum space for disciplinary purposes.  ‘[T]he 
psychiatrist’s body is the asylum itself,’ continues Foucault (2006b, 182), and, ‘ultimately, 
the asylum machinery and the psychiatrist’s organism must form one and the same thing.’  
This physician must always be on the move around the asylum, ‘communicating’ his will to 
every corner of the establishment, strolling through, glancing, encountering, directing, 
commenting and affecting all that transpires.  It is as if he is the ‘vital’ force that travels the 
‘nerves’ vibrating from one location to another in the asylum-organism, effectively 
constituting those ‘nerves’, and the impression is tangibly of a carceral facility full of 
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movement, of membranes in motion, in contrast to the static bricks-and-bars geometry of 
the Panoption. 
 
Psychiatric Power hence offers an excitingly different take on the phenomenon of mobilities 
within immobilities, even when only considering the movements of the resident physician.  
Once the movements of the inmates are acknowledged, the picture becomes even more 
intriguing, at which point we return (if only partially) to the shadowy moving worlds of Willie 
and others on the receiving end of institutionalised asylum regimes.  Crucial here is Lecture 
9 of the Psychiatric Power series, given on 16th January 1974, which addresses how 
‘psychiatric power’ began to travel, to leak from dedicated asylum spaces, seeping into 
wider domains of social life.  One direction of this leakage was into embryonic treatments of 
so-called ‘idiocy’, especially as linked into practices arising in institutions for children 
labelled as ‘idiots’, ‘imbeciles’ and ‘feeble-minded’ (later terms would be ‘mental 
retardation’ and ‘mental handicap’, with more recent versions being ‘learning’, ‘intellectual’ 
or ‘developmental disability’).9  An irony is that ‘idiocy’ was principally understood as an 
organic condition, an object of physical rather than ‘mental’ medicine, and yet it became a 
site for colonisation and experiment by ‘psychiatric power’.  Foucault considers the work of 
Edouard (later Edward) Seguin (1812-1880), a famous figure in the history of ‘idiocy’,10 
demonstrating from Seguin’s ideas and practices how, ‘once placed within the asylum space, 
the power exercised on idiot children is precisely psychiatric power in the pure state’ 
(Foucault, 2006b, 214) – ‘pure’ precisely because there was then no meaningful ‘psy’ 
knowledge with anything helpful to say about ‘idiocy’, only a suite of embodied practices. 
 
Seguin’s approach rested squarely on such practices: indeed, he came to describe his 
approach as ‘the physiological method’ (Seguin, 1866), seeking to train the ‘idiot’s’ body 
rather than reason with his or her mind,11 although he initially did write of a traitment moral 
(‘moral treatment’) also associated with ‘hygienic’ and ‘educational’ responses to the 
challenge of ‘idiocy’ (Seguin, 1846).  Foucault suggests that Seguin conceived of ‘[t]he 
struggle of two wills’ (in Foucault, 2006b, 215), the teacher’s (or doctor’s) and the ‘idiot’ 
pupil’s, with the resources of the former ranged against the ‘stubbornness’ of the latter’s 
instinctive ‘will not to will’ (to be entirely embodied and beyond cognitive control).  What 
particularly gripped my attention – in fact, the primary spur for the present paper – was 
Foucault’s (2006b, 217) illustration of this struggle using the following detail, quoting 
directly from Seguin’s 1846 text: 
 
Seguin produced the theory and practice of this physical clinch of idiot child 
and omnipotent master. For example, he tells how he succeeded in subduing 
an unruly child: “A.H. was uncontrollably lively; climbing like a cat, slipping 
away like a mouse, one shouldn’t have thought of getting him to stand upright 
and still for three seconds. I put him on a chair and sat opposite him, holding 
his feet and knees behind mine; one of my hands held his two on his knees 
while the other constantly brought his mobile face back in front of me. Apart 
from eating and sleeping, we stayed like that for five weeks.” 
 
As should be obvious, this example hinges on the relation between mobility and immobility, 
the objective being to still the restless mobility of A.H., the constant motion of his body, 
flailing of legs, flapping of arms and spinning of head, and instead to create a state of 
9 
 
complete immobility, a stillness of body coupled to a steadiness of gaze (of A.H. upon 
Seguin).  As a minuscule instance of a thoroughly embodied micro-physics of power, with 
two bodies locked together for five weeks, there can perhaps be no more striking 
manifestation of immobility, the ‘fixing’ of bodies in space, central to Foucault’s exposition 
of modern disciplinary power.  Yet, as this instance also makes plain, it is the bodily interface 
between rebel mobilities and imposed immobility that is at stake: the will to move being 
subdued by the will to (make someone else) keep still.  To me, in profound fashion, this 
instance encompasses the whole dynamic between ‘vital’ disruptions and ‘biopolitical’ 
control (or simply ‘biopower’) that, with caveats, runs the length and breadth of Foucault’s 
oeuvre, scorning those critics who only see here dominating power, discursive construction 
and no place for what resists (also Philo, 2012).12  Moreover, the relation between mobilities 
and immobilities has always been clawing its way into this dynamic, even in those moments 
when Foucault’s focus seems resolutely on ‘immobilising’ rather than on ‘making mobile’. 
 
More lessons from Seguin on mobilities and immobilities  
 
That said, we can arguably deepen this claim if we depart from what Foucault himself writes 
about Seguin, and instead offer a brief Foucauldian engagement with passages to be found 
in Seguin’s 1866 text, Idiocy and its Treatment by the Physiological Method (see Figure 1).  
Unapologetically, then, the following section will comprise a slab of empirical material, 
dependent on lengthy quotation, wherein the quotes themselves can, in large measure, 
carry the weight of a gradually unfolding argument.  Seguin (1866, 16) characterised the task 
before the physician-educator of ‘idiocy’ as ‘finding modes of training, natural and yet 
powerful enough, to bring into physiological activity impaired functions, and even atrophied 
organisms.’  Borrowing Foucault’s term, much of the 1866 text prescribed a minutely-
detailed ‘dressage’ of the ‘idiot’ body, best accomplished in the context of a specialist ‘idiot 
institution’, asylum or school (Seguin was agnostic about the best nomenclature) wherein, 
at this macro-level, the institution’s residents were to be separated from the remainder of 
everyday society (thereby effectively immobilised at a societal scale).  Page after page 
itemised the training of muscles, nerves, reflexes and functions, all through sustained micro-
management of (using Seguin’s own words) ‘movement’, ‘locomotion’, ‘prehension’, 
‘manipulation’, ‘imitation’ and then ‘communication’.  Several of these terms immediately 
signal the training of embodied mobilities, but all of the bodily capacities listed here, and 
many more besides, depended intimately upon getting these mobilities ‘right’; and most 
were also linked to a fastidious regulation of how the young ‘idiots’ were to move around 
their institution and through its many component spaces (also Philo, 2014).  Specifically, 
Seguin discussed ‘calisthenics’ or even ‘gymnastics’, with the latter term even used when 
speaking of, for example, a ‘gymnastics of the hands’ (Seguin, 1866: 125), with wonderfully 
precise instructions about hand movements and how they might be trained.  If ever there 
was a book about bodily mobilities and, as we will see shortly, immobilities, a book worthy 






Figure 1: Frontispiece of Edward Seguin, Idiocy: and its Treatment by the 
Physiological Method (William Wood & Co., 61 Walker Street, New York, 
1866). (Out of copyright) 
 
More generally, Seguin (1866, 195) described the goal as being to convert ‘the rather 
immovable or ungovernable mass called an idiot’ into an organised, movable body of matter 
with a range of new capacities, a highly organic and ‘vitalist’ vision.  Crucially, unlike with the 
restless A.H., discussed above, the ‘idiot’ body was portrayed here as ‘immovable’, as being 
too immobile as opposed to too mobile, but the apparent contradiction can be quickly 
dispelled by addressing a handful of longer quotations where the mobility-immobility axis 
was explicitly foregrounded, noticing how ‘immovability’ of both bodies and wills entered 
the analysis.  As Seguin (1866, 71) wrote: 
 
We meet … frequently with the partial loss of movement expressed by the 
fixedness of the child where and as he [sic.] is placed, standing, lying, seated 
any way, or by the impossibility of his hands taking hold of anything, even 
carrying food to the mouth; he is immovable of his own will, movable only by 
another’s as by an external spring. 
 
Here the stubborn mass that may be the ‘idiot’ child was indeed understood simply as too 
resolutely immobile: 
 
This relative immovability of the idiot, … the result of inertia, has no parentage 
whatever with the immobility by which a man [sic.] or an animal assembles his 
forces to throw them into action; this is a positive, the other a negative 
attitude. From positive immobility springs an active determination; in negative 
immovability resides the power to … neutralise any external inducement or 
any internal motive to action. This immovability is therefore the first 
expression we meet with of the radical elements of idiocy, the negative will. 
11 
 
Henceforth we shall find many and the most varied incapacities, all doubled, 
made nearly indomitable by the silent protean “I will not” of the negative will. 
Impossible now to forget it, and whenever found it has to be treated, as we 
will do presently, where it would perpetuate, with incapacity of motion, the 
whole train of idiocy.  (Seguin, 1866, 71, my emphases) 
 
In effect, Seguin wished to foster exactly that readiness to spring from still-standing into 
purposeful, efficient and speedy motion which Foucault spies in the training of the parade-
ground recruit, recounted earlier, the secret being to cultivate the bodily state of 
preparedness to move, of being poised on the threshold of movement, so as to counter an 
individual’s determination never to move.  The dialectic of mobility and immobility, with the 
one always on the brink of becoming the other, was hence, for Seguin, of supreme import; 
as too was the significance of regarding stillness as the baseline, the ‘potential-filled’ 
resource, for movement (also Murphie, 2011 [and linking to the wider concerns of Bissell 
and Fuller, 2009b, 2011b]). 
 
In order to cultivate this ‘positive immobility’, though, Seguin knew that his ‘idiot’ charges 
absolutely had to know, or at least sense, how to be completely still, returning him to the 
problem of how to stop the mobilities – the ‘automatic, mechanical or spasmodic motions’ 
(Seguin, 1866, 71) – of children like A.H.: 
 
As long as these motions exist with or without negative immobility of the rest 
of the body, we cannot expect to see the child improve in willed action nor in 
active immobility; therefore it is our duty to try to overcome it all at once 
when we can, or as soon as possible. … Happily the exercises undertaken in 
view of destroying the disordered motions may be at the same time calculated 
to promote willed immobility and orderly movements; consequently, both 
objects may be attained at once, and described at the same time. 
 
In effect, ‘positive immobility’ and ‘orderly movements’ should be taught at the same time, 
and Seguin formulated numerous ‘exercises’ designed to combat different species of 
restless movement in an ‘idiot’ child.  He even explained how one might proceed in training 
a child who combined within a single body simultaneous deficiencies with respect to both 
mobility and immobility, reporting a case where he countered immobility in one arm but 
hyper-mobility in the other using a complicated assemblage of bodies (his and the child’s), 
limbs (hands on knees), chairs and a dumb-bell weight.  He reflected: 
 
The case presented here is one in which partial immobility was the prominent 
aim; conversely in another case, immobility shall be secondary, and movement 
the principal object, as when we keep the whole body quite motionless to 
concentrate the attention upon delicate exercises of a single part. But we 
cannot forget that our final object is to teach complete immobility; and to 
come to it, no pains [and] no time must be spared, because our reward will be 
the harmony and usefulness of all the subsequent movements. (Seguin, 1866, 
73-74) 
 
Put thus, it transpires that stopping mobilities was, after all, the ultimate goal for this 
particular species of ‘biopolitical’ intervention, albeit that the resulting immobility was taken 
as the condition for all of the more positive movements which the ‘idiot’ child might 
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subsequently be able to make, from the closest-in movements of hands and feet to the 
scaled-up movements around (and possibly even beyond) the environs of an institution.  ‘As 
immobility is in nature the fulcrum of movement,’ observed Seguin (1866, 74), ‘so in our 
training it will precede and close every exercise, and serve as transition and as repose 
between the various modes of active training.’  To translate back to Foucault, in all of his 
texts stressing the imposition of immobility, even behind walls and bars, there are also 
many occasions where this immobility is clearly being trained as ‘the fulcrum of movement’: 
when negativity shifts into the positivity, or when ‘repressive’ power is on the cusp of 
converting into ‘productive’ power, not just stopping things but making things happen (and, 
of course, move: also Watkins and Noble, 2011).  That does not obviate an ethico-political 
critique of such power; and Foucault is not celebrating Seguin, to be sure, but rather 
deploying him as a vehicle for critically appraising how mid-nineteenth century ‘psychiatric 
power’ (and the ‘psychiatrist’s body-asylum space’) began to capture ‘idiocy’ in its 
disciplinary grip.  By recovering Seguin’s remarkable deliberations about the mobility-
immobility dialectic, however, I hope to add new texture to our understanding of what a 
Foucauldian social-institutional history can disclose – when operating at the most intimate 
scale of embodied incarceration – that shifts us far beyond the brute fact of merely 
curtailing mobilities. 
 
Foucault and mobilities in old asylums: a mildly heretical postscript 
 
To an extent, my job is now done, and the need to explore Foucault’s attention to mobilities 
within immobilities amply demonstrated, even when reading his ostensibly least mobility-
aware texts and amplifying one of the least-known of these texts, Psychiatric Power.  I wish 
to offer a final plot-twist to my reasoning, however, by returning now to the version of 
Madness and Civilization that Foucault himself in part disowned.  As is fairly well-known, the 
original French version of this text (Foucault, 1961) – followed by the full-length English re-
translation simply entitled History of Madness (Foucault, 2006a) – embraced, particularly 
but not exclusively in its original preface, various phenomenological undertones that hinted 
at a romanticisation of ‘madness’ as a real and special domain of human being-and-truth.  
These facets were present, if muted, in the abridged English translation of 1965, the version 
principally used by Anglophone readers (Foucault, 1965; see commentary in Still and Velody, 
1992; also Gordon, 1990), and they were more fully purged in later French editions, which 
carried an entirely new preface, as well as in various qualifications and retractions from 
other of Foucault’s later writings.  Maybe piqued by Derrida’s (1981 [initially in French 
1963]) critique but also emerging from his own later ‘structuralist’ encounters, Foucault lost 
the romantic phenomenology of the original book, arguably creating, in consequence, 
certain instabilities for the book’s overall narrative logic and arc (Philo, 2013).  Maybe 
overstating the case, Hacking (2006, xii) nonetheless speaks of two essentially different 
books: 
 
One of these books is governed by an idea of déraison, in which there lurks a 
dream of madness in the wild, as something pre-discursive, inaccessible, pure. 
The other book is what the first became, stripped of romantic illusion. 
 
On the one hand, ‘madness’ is pictured as full of frenzied, unknowable and unpredictable 
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Figure 2: Yard with Lunatics, a painting by Francisco de Goya, probably 
from c.1793-1794, reproduced on the jacket front cover of Foucault, M., 
History of Madness (Routledge, London, 2006). (Permission being sought) 
 
To elaborate this claim, it might be said that the imagery permeating the original French 
version and the full English translation, reinforced by cover illustrations of different editions, 
is that of ‘the madhouse’ as painted several times by the Spanish Romanticist artist, 
Francisco de Goya (1746-1828).  Yard with Lunatics, informed by scenes from institutions 
witnessed by the young Goya in Zaragoza, is the English title of the image deployed on the 
jacket of History of Madness (Foucault, 2006a) (see Figure 2).  With Goya, writes Foucault 
(2006a, 361), ‘[a] whole imaginary landscape re-emerges, animated by the great fear that 
confinement now evokes.’  It was in the early European asylums – often little more than 
converted fortresses, full of cells, bars, locks and all the accoutrements of punitive 
incarceration – that ‘madness’ came to reside in its many different faces; and here, ‘lurking 
in the shadows, was the dark power of an imaginary that many hoped had been exorcised 
for good.’  The precise connections between such allusive statements and the actual longer-
run history of ‘madness’ and asylums, including the extent to which ‘the mad’ were ever 
really confined, cannot now be addressed,13 but the existential point for Foucault (the 
author of the original text) was that here – in the darkened cellars of these Early Modern 
madhouses – lay the animal truths of what it is to be ‘human’.  They housed an expression 
of the ‘madness’ within, prior to the superficial veneers of human civilization; they hosted ‘a 
great space of murmuring’ rebounding from wall to wall, a ‘language’ unintelligible to most 
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listeners but still the ‘charred root of meaning’, in sum the barely-human chaosmos from 
which semblances of a human order are hewn in such a fragile, reversible manner 
(paraphrasing Foucault, 2006a, xxxi-xxxiii).  Echoing claims made earlier, it is the ‘vital’ 
foundation, the unworded, instinctual bedrock of life, from which ‘biopolitical’ edifices 
composed of rationally calculated human words-and-deeds are so precariously raised.  At 
the same time, it is a foundation that mocks and constantly threatens to be the point of 
return for a humanity denying its ‘madness’, the point where ‘the anthropological circle’ 
indeed turns full circle.14 
 
Such is the extraordinary subtext of Madness and Civilization ‘uncut’, one that a more 
‘structural’, less grand-standing, older and wiser Foucault probably found a touch 
embarrassing, and from which he effectively recanted.  Yet, for me, it cannot now be 
unwritten, not least because of what it does to our reconstruction of Foucault’s thinking 
about the mobility-immobility relation.  In one respect, this subtext is all about immobility, 
the incarceration of ‘madness’ in prison-like structures, penned in behind high walls and 
seemingly cut-off from interactions with an everyday social world outside.  In another, 
though, it is all about mobilities within immobility.  As evoked in Figure 2, it is to envisage 
‘flesh swarming in the void’ (Foucault, 2006a, 530), a carceral micro-world full of pulsating, 
writhing bodies, crazily admixed and in constant agitated motion, with ‘mad’ occupants 
relatively free to move, if not chained, to initiate and to resist bodily contacts, all the while 
speaking, shouting, screaming, crying and buzzing ‘the murmur of dark insects’ (Foucault, 
2006a, xxxiii).  Again, the truth of what really occurred in many Early Modern asylums is 
beyond the scope of my paper, although evidence from archival sources such as inmate 
accounts or parliamentary inquiries suggests that some ‘madhouses’ (in Britain meaning 
private asylums or pauper lunatic wings of poorhouses: Philo, 2004, Chaps.4 and 5) probably 
did equate with a Goya-esque imagery.  For my purposes, what matters is that this subtext 
of Madness and Civilization implies something very different from what has chiefly been 
discussed above: namely, not the mastering or even deliberate cultivation of mobilities 
(embodied movements) within the immobilising confines of carceral space, but instead the 
unmastered, unruly, restless, listless and maybe aimless mobilities of inmates who resist or 
at least transgress the imposition of human orders. 
 
While of a tamer, more minor register to the raging ‘mad’ folk of Goya’s paintings and 
Foucault’s romantic phenomenology, Willie’s trolley-bus wanderings around Craig Dunain – 
unscripted and unsanctioned, if largely ignored, by the hospital’s authorities – nonetheless 
sit on the opposite, distaff, side of the disciplined mobility practices (and programmes) 
explored elsewhere by Foucault.  Even so, it is precisely because there is this distaff side, this 
domain of discrepant mobilities, that everything then written by Foucault about the 
ordering of mobilities makes sense: without them, there would be nothing to regulate, no 
‘vital’ errancy calling for ‘biopolitical’ correction, no dangerous ‘nomadism’ whose ‘effects’ 
must be ‘eliminated’, no ‘mad’ motions calling forth ‘civilized’ fixes; in short, no real reason 
why Foucault should ever have bothered thinking about mobilities in the first place.  That he 
did think about mobilities has hopefully been shown by this paper, even on the rather 
unpromising canvases comprised by texts where, to the initial glance at least, the story is 
overwhelmingly about immobilities and immobilisation.  Why and how he did think about 
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1 For a longer discussion of Neville’s observations about Willie, see Philo (2007b). We encountered 
Neville’s writings about Willie in the course of research on the social geographies of people with 
mental health problems living in remote, rural parts of Highland Scotland (eg. Parr et al, 2004), and 
we are very grateful to him for letting us have a sight of papers that he prepared when taking a 
Master of Arts in ‘Advanced Professional Practice in Health Care’. Unfortunately, we never met Willie 
ourselves, and neither do we know what became of him following the closure of ‘the Craig’. 
 
2 See also the very recent edited collection, Carceral Spaces: Mobility and Detention in Imprisonment 
and Migrant Detention (Moran et al, 2013), where a number of essays explore precisely the relations 
between mobilities – at scales from journeys across national space to (if less covered) the scale of 
intra-institutional movements – and blockages of or friction on such mobilities, notably traffic across 
institutional boundaries. 
 
3 From my own disciplinary home of ‘Geography’, a far from complete list would include studies of 
asylums and other psychiatric in-patient facilities (Philo, 1989), prisons (Ferrant, 1997; Ogborn, 1995; 
Philo, 2001), workhouses (Driver, 1993), reformatories (Driver, 1990; Ploszajska, 1994) and factories 
or mills (Stein, 1994; Wainwright, 2005). 
 
4 There may be parallels to be drawn here to claims now familiar in the recent literature of human 
geography energised by Thrift’s (2004, 2008; also Amin and Thrift, 2013) ideas about the 
‘engineering’ of embodied, affective (human) responses to the world. Indeed, while beyond the 
scope of this paper, there could be scope for utilising these materials to reconsider the apparent 
interpretative-empirical gulf between Foucault and Thrift (see Thrift, 2007; Philo, 2012). 
 
5 Foucault (1976, 151-152) actually discusses the military camp as his first and prime exemplar of 
enclosure in the relevant few paragraphs tackling this principle distributional art. 
 
6 There should always be a hesitation about speaking of ‘dialectics’ when discussing Foucault, who 
was often scornful of traditional dialectical thinking, regarding it as too simplistic, too homogenising, 
too ready to smooth away the jagged edges of contradiction and combat. 
 
7 Caution is needed with the term ‘psychiatry’, given that it did not enjoy wide currency until late in 
the nineteenth century. Indeed, Foucault’s claims in these lectures are essentially about the ‘proto-
psychiatry’ or the pre-history of what we now take as modern, medicalised psychiatry (itself, of 
course, a far from singular animal). 
 
8 Matters were actually somewhat more complex than these statements imply, not least in that forms 
of medical – as in physical, somatic – treatment of ‘madness’ do have deep roots, dating at least to 
Ancient Greece. The later-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries in Europe and North America 
nonetheless witnessed a daring shift away from medical towards ‘moral’ justifications for the asylum, 
with medical authority over the latter genuinely seen as a minor or contested issue. One way of 
appreciating the nineteenth-century history of ‘madness’ is therefore to see it as the medical 
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progressively re-colonising, annexing to its own, the ‘moral’ principles for treating ‘madness’, many of 
which had precisely amounted to practical-situational solutions for persuading the insane to act sane 
(a key message of Madness and Civilization [Foucault, 1965] when discussing experimental reforms 
by the likes of Tuke and Pinel). Psychiatric Power is hence in some respects a detailed account 
precisely of how said solutions became progressively configured as ‘medical’ (or ‘psychiatric’) simply 
by virtue of being applied by ‘medical men’ in spaces imitating hospitals for the physically sick. For a 
detailed exploration of ‘medical’ and ‘moral’ stances in this historical geography of ‘madness’ and 
asylums, see Philo (2004). 
 
9 A small body of historical scholarship on ‘idiocy’ can be identified, but I would particularly cite 
recent critical accounts by Goodey (2012) and Simpson (2014). It should also be added that there are 
significant linguistic differences in the terminology for this supposedly ‘other’ state of being-in-the-
world, perhaps reflecting conceptual divergences too, between different world regions. 
 
10 Seguin was a French physician who initially worked under Jean Gaspar Itard, another key figure in 
histories of ‘idiocy’, before opening his own Parisian private training school for ‘idiots’ in 1840. A child 
of the French Revolution, influenced by the Utopian socialist Henri de Saint-Simon, Seguin’s political 
sensibilities made him vulnerable as anti-Revolutionary forces re-established themselves, and in 1848 
(the ‘Year of Revolutions’ across Europe) he was forced to flee possible denunciation at home by 
emigrating to the US. ‘Eduoard’ duly became ‘Edward’, and he became involved with various public 
asylums for ‘idiots’ in the US, eventually opening his own training school for feeble-minded children 
(and their nurses and teachers) in New York City, as well as becoming the first President of the US 
Association for Medical Officers of American Institutions for Idiotic and Feeble-Minded Children. 
 
11 Much could be made of Seguin’s wish for his physical or ‘physiological’ approach to break from a 
prior mental or ‘psychological’ approach when treating ‘idiocy’, as associated with his one-time 
infuence, Itard. 
 
12 A crucial caveat is that I follow Foucault in effectively scrambling the otherwise neat periodisations 
of power – ‘sovereign’, ‘disciplinary’ and ‘biopower’ – sometimes implied in his earlier writings. 
Rather, I follow his portrayal of differing and overlapping series of power, notably from the closing 
pages of the “Society must be Defended” lectures (Foucault, 2003c), and I am also prepared to speak 
of ‘biopower’ at work whenever (and wherever) there is a clear ‘biopolitical’ impression upon the 
‘vitalities’ of human existence, whether at the level of population planning, say, or that of promoting 
embodied capacities (as in Seguin’s approach to ‘idiocy’). 
 
13 There is of course a very substantial literature on the histories of ‘madness, mad people, mad-
doctors and madhouses’, with some authors downplaying the extent and significance of ‘mad’ people 
being confined in either general or specialist institutional settings, but with others regarding such 
confinement as historically decisive. For the latter, the argument may be framed less in terms of the 
actual numbers ever confined, albeit the numbers globally have been huge thoughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, and more in terms of establishing an imagined division – to echo Said 
(1978), a massive ‘imaginative geography’ of us/here (the ‘sane’) who are (and seemingly should be) 
kept apart from them/there (the ‘insane’) – with multiple implications for diverse realms of policy, 
practice and everyday social attitudes and expectations. For geographically-inflected discussion, see 
Philo (2004) and Parr (2008). 
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